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Abstract:  In this paper, regional governments provide a good which generates 
interregional spillovers in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership and 
household attachment to regions. The central government redistributes income after it 
observes regional policymaking. Imperfectly mobile households choose their region of 
residence in perfect knowledge of the whole set of federal policies. We show that, 
irrespective the intensity of household attachment, the federal policies yield an 
efficient allocation of resources for the federal economy if there exist markets for both 
private and purely public characteristics of the commodity. This result appears relevant 
for a federation such as the European Union. 
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 1. Introduction 
  According to the conventional wisdom in fiscal federalism, regional public 
goods that generate interregional spillovers -- that is, goods whose economic 
jurisdiction exceeds the political jurisdiction of a regional or local government -- 
should be subjected to a Pigouvian subsidy determined by a higher-level government, 
namely, the central government (see, for example, Oates (1972)). Local governments 
should provide local public goods as far as economic and political jurisdictions 
coincide, but local public goods that generate interregional spillovers should be 
provided by a supralocal level of government.   
  Recent studies, however, demonstrate that there are circumstances under which 
competing regional governments may not only provide public goods that generate 
transboundary spillovers efficiently, but also implement interregional transfers to each 
other so that a socially efficient population distribution is obtained. In Wellisch (1994), 
competing regional governments fully internalize externalities associated with 
provision of public goods in their regions whenever households are not attached to 
regions. Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2000) demonstrate that decentralized provision of a 
pure public good -- a good whose economic benefit is available for an entire federation 
  1-- may be efficient for a game where regional governments are policy leaders and a 
central government is a policy follower. Regional governments decide how much of 
the pure public good to provide in anticipation of the redistributive income policy 
implemented by the center.  The efficiency result does not depend on the degree of 
household attachment. 
  In this paper, we extend the framework advanced by Caplan, Cornes and Silva 
(2000) by considering commodities that generate regional-specific benefits as well as 
federal-like benefit (good) or cost (bad).    Consider, for example, provision of energy.   
Energy generates private consumption benefits as well as a federal-like damage (bad), 
since its consumption or production typically yields emissions of pollutants in the 
atmosphere (e.g., carbon dioxide). As in Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2000), we are 
interested in analyzing the allocation of resources for a federal economy characterized 
by imperfect labor mobility and decentralized leadership. Our example of such a 
federal economy coincides with theirs, namely the European Union (EU). The 
governments of the member nations are endowed with considerable economic and 
political powers vis-à-vis the center concerning most types of policies, including 
  2environmental policies. 
  Our federal regimes are hierarchical. They are built after the federal structure in 
the EU. Regional governments are concerned with controlling emissions of carbon 
dioxide in their own regions. We postulate that such a control is done through setting 
up quotas of pollution permits that can be sold in a regional or federal market for 
pollution permits. We start the analysis by considering a situation where in each region 
– there are only two for simplicity – we find a regional market for pollution permits. 
Residents of a region are unable to trade permits with residents or power plants of the 
other region.    We also assume that the energy commodity is traded within each region. 
Later, we analyze the implications of federal markets for both energy and pollution 
permits.  The center is endowed with an instrument to implement transfers and 
effects these transfers after the regional governments decide how many pollution 
permits to supply to market participants. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of an 
impure public bad in a federal economy and derives the social optimum. Section 3 
analyzes the decentralized Nash equilibrium in an autarkical economy. It shows that 
  3the redistribution policy of the center falls short of providing regional governments 
with incentives to efficiently curb emissions of carbon dioxide. This result is in 
contrast with the one obtained by Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2000) because of the 
impurity of the commodity examined here. Section 4 examines the efficiency 
properties of federal markets for energy and pollution permits. In this section, we 
demonstrate that a federal regime mirrored after the EU may yield an efficient 
allocation of resources for the federal economy.    We conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2. The Model 
The federation consists of two regions indexed by ii ,1 , 2 = . There are   
households in the economy. To simplify notation, we let 
N
1 N = . The population of 
region   is denoted by  . We assume that the utility function of households is 
heterogeneous only with respect to their attachment to a region as in Mansoorian and 
Myers (1993) and in Wellisch (1994). Then, each type of household is assumed to be 
distributed uniformly on the interval 
i i n
[ ] 0,1 . Households of region   derive utility 
from consumption of 
i
i x  units of the numeraire goods and   units of energy. 
Furthermore, since one unit of energy is assumed to generate one unit of air pollution, 
i e
  4all households in the economy consume  11 22 En en e ≡ +  units of a federal bad. The 
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 is a strictly quasi-concave sub-utility function, increasing in the first and 
second elements and decreasing in the third element. The parameter   measures the 
non-pecuniary benefit the household derives from living in region 2 and the parameter 
 the benefit from living in region 1 and the constant parameter   denotes 
the attachment intensity.  For a
n
0 a ≥
= , households are perfectly mobile. As a 
increases, households become less mobile. All households can choose their region of 
residence and there is no cost associated with migration. Since the psychic benefit 
each household derives from a region is idiosyncratic, a migration equilibrium is 
obtained when 
() ) ( 11 1 22 ,, ,, uxeE a n uxe = ,     (2) 
where   identifies the marginal household who is indifferent between location in 
either region. While each household with   less than   resides in region 1, each 
household with   grater than n  resides in region 2. Hence,   is also the number 
1 n
n 1 n
n 1 1 n
  5(measure) of households residing in region 1. 
  Each resident of region i is endowed with one unit of homogeneous labor 
which is supplied at region  . All workers are employed in the production of the 
numeraire good. The production function for the numeraire good in region   is 
assumed to be a strictly concave function 
i
i
( ) ( ) ,
i
ii i FL n fn ≡
i , where   denotes the 
fixed resource endowment of region  , say land. The production cost of energy, in 





i cE. This cost function is assumed to 
be increasing and strictly convex.   
  The central government is constrained by both free migration of households (2) 
and the feasibility restriction for the entire federation: 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
12 12
11 22 1 2 1 2 nx nx c E c E f n f n ++ + = + . (3) 
The federation’s total expenditure in the left-hand side must be covered by entire 
production (i.e., total income) in the right-hand side. Furthermore, the total demand for 
energy in the economy must be equal to the aggregate provisions of energy in 
equilibrium: 
  . (4)  11 22 1 2 ne ne E E += +
  6  For a fixed  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈ , an efficient allocation can be obtained as a solution to the 
following problem: 
  () ( ) ( )
12 1 212 1
11 22 ,,,,,, max , , 1 , ,
xxeeEEn uxeE uxeE θθ +− , (5) 
subject to (2), (3), (4) and the fact that  12 1 nn + = . Although (5) ignores locational 
tastes, this maximization problem can characterize an efficient allocation for a given 
weight  θ . Since neither the central government nor regional governments can affect 
the psychic benefit each household derives from a particular region, any locational 
change must be accompanied by a change in either   or u .
1 u
2 1  
 Let  1 λ ,  2 λ  and  3 λ   be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the migration 
equilibrium constraint (2), the feasibility constraint (3) and the market clearing 
condition for energy, respectively. For a fixed  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈ , the efficient allocation is 
characterized by the following first-order conditions, provided the solution is interior: 
  () 2 0
i
ii x i xun θλ + =  for  i =1,2, and  i , (6a)  j ≠
  () ( ) 3 0
ii j
ii e i E j i E i eu n un u n θθ λ ++ + =  for  i =1,2, and  , (6b)  i ≠ j
  () 23 0
i
iE Ec λλ − =  for  i =1,2, and  i , (6c)  j




1  Wellisch (1994) explains why a Pareto efficient allocation must maximize   using  a 
revealed preference argument: if a change in location did not increase utilities, it would not be made. 
()
12 1 u θθ +−
  7  () () () ( ) ( )
12 1 2
11 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 20 EE n n nu u e e a f x f x θθλ λ λ  ++ − −− − − −=  , (6d) 
where  11 θ θλ ≡+ ,  () 2 1 1 θ θ ≡−− λ  and partial derivatives are denoted by the 
subscripts. Combining equations (6a), (6b) and (6c) yields necessary conditions for the 
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Equations (7) represent the modified Samuelson rule in the case of an impure public 
bad. The regional sum of the marginal benefits for marginal reduction of emission of 
air pollution in the left-hand side must be equal to the marginal costs in the right-hand 
side, that is, the utility cost of giving up one unit of private energy in terms of the 
numeraire good and the saving in production of it. Equations (6c) imply the 
equalization of marginal costs of energy provision: 
  . (8) 
1 cc =
Equations (7) and (8) tell us that the marginal utility of energy in terms of the 
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Finally, equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) imply: 
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Expression (10) is the well-known efficient population distribution condition in the 
case of an impure public bad (see, for example, Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and 
Wellisch (1994)). If households are perfect mobile: a = , equation (10) can be 
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The net social benefit of an additional mobile household to a region must be equal 
across regions in the unique efficient equilibrium. If households are imperfectly 
mobile:  , there is a range of efficient population distributions, which depend on 
the center’s weight parameter 
0 a >
[ ] 0,1 θ ∈ . 
3. Autarky 
Consider now a setting in which each regional government regulates emission of air 
pollution under an autarkical economy, that is, the regions do not trade with each other. 
We assume that households who reside in a given region own the fixed factor located 
in that region on an equal per capita basis. Since each household is identically 
productive and is employed by competitive firms that produce the numeraire good, 
  9each individual’s total income in region i  is  ( )
i
ii f nn . Furthermore, each 
household in the region is assumed to own equal profit shares of the regional energy 
companies. Suppose that each regional government sets emission permits   and 
endows each resident with 





. The energy industries must purchase the emission 
permits at per unit cost    for production of energy. Then, each resident of region 











+= ≡  for  i =1,2, and  , (11)  i ≠ j
where  i p  denotes the prevailing price of one unit of energy , 
i π  corresponds to the 
energy company’s profit and   represents the interregional income transfer made by 
the central government. The central government will be assumed to implement the 
redistribution policy as it wishes provided that 
i t
120 tt + = .  
  Each household in region   chooses quantities of private consumption  i { } , ii x e
i
 
to maximize   subject to his or her budget constraint (11), taking  ( ,, ii uxeE ) p ,  , 
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provided the solution is interior. Equations (12) show that in each region the resident’s 
  10marginal rate of substitution between energy and numeraire goods must be equal to the 
price of energy. We can now use equations (11) and (12) to define the demand 
functions of the resident in region  :  i ( ) , ii i x pw and  ( ) , ii i w ep .  
  The energy market clears at  ( ) , ii i i i En e p w =  for i =1,2. These market clearing 
conditions determine the market prices of energy  i p . The energy companies in region 
 are assumed to be price takers. Then the aggregated profit of energy industry in 
region   is 
i
i ( ) ( )
i
i i i c E r E −
ii i
i
ii i Ep E π ≡− . The profit maximization condition 
determines   as a function of  i E p r ρ ≡ − . The market in region   for pollution 
permits is in equilibrium when all regional emission permits are bought by regional 
industries: 
i
() ii i EQ ρ = . We can use these equilibrium conditions to implicitly define 
. Hence, per capita income    can be rewritten as follows:  ( Q ) i ii ρρ = i w
   ()
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,,
ii
ii i i i i i i
ii ii
i






wn . (13) 
  In our federation, regional governments are Stackelberg leaders and a central 
government is a Stackelberg follower. This seems to accord well with the institutional 
setup of the European Union. The regulator in region i regulates the supply of 
energy   so as to maximize the utility of a resident  i E ( ) ,, ii eE ux  subject to (13). 
  11Furthermore, we assume that each region takes the other regional choice as given. 
Both regional governments determine their emission permits in anticipation of the 
interregional redistribution policy implemented by the center and the location choices 
of households. More precisely, the timing for the game is as follows: 
 1
st stage: Region   determines   to  maximize  i i Q ( ) ,, ii eE ux  subject  to  




nd stage: The central government observes  ,   and  determines t  to  Q Q
 maximize  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 22 ,, 1 ,, uxeE uxeE θ +− θ  subject to    
  .  () 11 1 ,, nm t Q Q = 2
 3
rd stage: After observing the choices made by regional governments and the  
  central government, each household decides a region to reside.   
As it is usually done, we start at the last stage of the game. We can now rewrite the 
migration equilibrium (2) as follows: 
  () ( ) ( ) 11 1 22 ,, 1 ,, vpwE a n vpw E a n +−= + 1 , (14) 




 is indirect utility functions for a 
representative resident in   and  = + . This equation determines   as an  1 n
  12implicit function of the policy variables:   
  . (15)  ( 11 1 ,, nm t Q Q = ) 2
































 for  i =1,2, and  . (16b)  i ≠ j
1 provided that the derivative of equation (15) with respect to  :  n
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 (17) 
is negative, since we focus our attention on situations at which the migration 
equilibrium is stable (see Stiglitz (1977) and Boadway (1982)). 
  Let us now examine the resource allocation in the second stage of the game. 
Assuming an interior solution for  , we obtain the following first-order condition in 
the central government’s maximization problem: 
t
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Combining equations (11), (12), (16a) and (18) yields the efficient population 
  13distribution condition (10). The equation defines the center’s redistribution policy as 
an implicit function of regional control variables:  ( ) 11 , tQ Q τ = 2 . Differentiation of the 
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where the weights of the center: 
*
1 θ  and 
*
2 θ  indicate θ  and 1 θ −  respectively  and 
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is negative.   
  In the first stage of the game, the regions determine their quotas of emission 
permits taking into account the responses by the center and population. Assuming 
interior solutions for their choice variables, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by 
the following first-order conditions: 
  ()
1 1
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2 E c  . (20b) 
  14The modified Samuelson conditions (7) require that the second terms in the left side of 
these equations to be equal to 
22 nu u 2 Ex , 
1 nu u
1
1 Ex , respectively. Combining equations 
(20) with (16) and (19), we have 
Proposition 1. Provided the solutions to the maximization problems are interior, the 
subgame perfect equilibrium for the game “Autarkical Decentralized Control” is 
characterized by equations (10), (16), (19) and (20). Since the equilibrium allocation 
does not satisfy the modified Samuelson conditions, it is Pareto inefficient. 
  Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2000) demonstrated that for a pure public good, the 
interregional transfer implemented by the center induces the regions to behave 
efficiently. For the impure public goods, however, our results above make it clear that 
the redistribution policy of the center falls short of providing regions with incentives 
to behave efficiently. This inefficiency is not based on the degree of household 
mobility since the center can attain the efficient population distribution with the 
transfer, but it is, in fact, based on the differences of the marginal rate of substitution 
(12) and the marginal cost of energy provision across regions.   
Corollary 1. If regions are identical, the subgame perfect equilibrium characterized by 
  15equations (16), (19) and (20) satisfies the modified Samuelson conditions. Then, the 
equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. 
  Corollary 1 states that decentralized environmental policy can be successful if 
prices and costs of energy happen to be equal across regions. In general, however, 
technology and tastes differ across regions. The following section examines the 
creation of interregional markets for energy and pollution permits and their 
implications for the allocation of resources in the federation. 
4. Interregional Markets 
Let us now consider a situation whereby there are two interregional markets in the 
federation, one for energy and one for pollution permits. The former market clears if 
there is equalization between demand for and supply of energy in the federation: 
  () () 11 1 22 2 ,, n e pw ne pw E + = . (21) 
The market clearing condition (21) determines the federal price of energy,  p . The 
energy industries must purchase the emission permits at per unit cost   for 








ii ii pEc E r E π ≡− −  subject  to  , taking  0 i E > p ,   and   as  given.  r j E
  16The first-order conditions for the industries: 
  ()
i
Ei cE prρ =− ≡ for  i =1,2, and  i , (22)  j ≠
determine   and    as implicit functions of  1 E 2 E ρ ,  ( )
*
1 E ρ  and  ()
*
2 E ρ , 
respectively. The market for pollution permits is in equilibrium whenever: 
  .   (23)  () ()
**
121 2 EEQ Q ρρ += + Q ≡
Equation (23) enables us to implicitly define ρ  as a function of Q :  .  
Given the assumptions above, the budget constraint for a household in region   can 
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Each resident in region   maximizes  i ( ) ,, ii eE ux   subject to above budget constraint, 
taking  p ,   and    as given. The solutions to the problem for  1,2 satisfy (24) 
and the following condition: 
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Equations (25) entail equalization of the marginal rates of substitution between energy 
  17and numeraire goods across regions. They yield equation (9). 
  We are now ready to examine the three-stage policy game. In the third stage, 
population moves across regions according to the following migration equilibrium: 
  () () ( )
*





We can use this equation to implicitly define the function:  . 
Differentiation of the function yields the following migration responses: 
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*
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where the response with respect to   is equivalent to (16a). These responses lead to 
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  Knowing how population will respond to its choice, the central government 
determines   so as to maximize  1 t ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 22 ,, 1 ,, uxeE uxeE θθ +−  in the second 
stage of the game. The first-order condition for the problem is characterized by 
equation (18). Hence, the center’s optimal choice implies that the efficient population 
distribution condition (10) is satisfied. Use this equation to define the implicit 
function:  . A straightforward exercise in comparative statics gives:  (
*
11 , Q Q τ ) 2 t =







− . (29) 
  In the first stage of the game, both regional governments determine their levels 
of emission permits, taking the response functions:  ( )
*
112 ,, mt Q Q and   
into account. Assuming interior solutions, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by the 
following first-order conditions: 
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  We will now examine whether these first-order conditions imply the modified 
Samuelson conditions (7). From equations (28) and (29), it follows that: 
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Subtracting equation (30b) from (30a) and using equations (29) and (31) yields: 
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  19It is clear that the expression in parenthesis of equation (32) is zero because  20 aD < . 
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Therefore, we have 
Proposition 2. If all regional governments supply positive quotas of emission permits 
in the interregional market for pollution, the subgame perfect equilibrium for the 
three-stage game just examined yields an efficient allocation of resources in the 
federal economy.   
  The result above makes it clear that combining decentralized control of the 
impure public bad with an interregional transfer mechanism implemented by the 
center induces the regions to behave efficiently provided there exist federal markets 
  20for energy and emission permits. Since both regional governments together provide a 
socially efficient level of emission permits in equilibrium, each region in fact faces its 
Lindahl price. Each region is endowed with the correct incentive to control the impure 
public bad; each region fully internalizes the transboundary externality. 
  It is now straightforward to show that a subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
three-stage game, satisfying the assumptions of the model and claim in Proposition 2, 
is Pareto efficient regardless of the degree of household mobility.  All we have to do 
is to consider the case where  . This case, however, is trivial because it would 
entail equalization of utilities across regions and hence perfect incentive equivalence 
(see, e.g., Myers (1990) and Wellisch (1994)).  Then, we can summarize these 
findings as follows: 
0 a =
Theorem 1. Provided there exist competitive markets for energy and pollution permits 
in the federation and both regions choose to supply positive quantities of permits in 
equilibrium, the subgame perfect equilibrium for the three-stage game examined in 
this section yields a Pareto efficient allocation of resources for the federal economy 
despite the intensity of household attachment to regions. 
  21  This is good news for federations such as the EU. Our results suggest that the 
efficiency of a federal market for pollution permits is contingent on the existence of 
both a competitive federal market for energy and the redistributive mechanism 
operated by the center (e.g., Structural and Cohesion Funds in the EU). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses decentralized control of an impure public bad, a commodity that 
generates both a private, regional-specific, benefit and a federal negative externality in 
a federation such as the EU characterized by imperfect household mobility. We show 
that decentralized environmental policy in absence of federal markets for energy and 
pollution permits is inefficient. We also show that there exists a combination of 
decentralized policy making and federal policy making that yields an efficient 
allocation of resources for the federal economy in the presence of a market for 
pollution permits and a competitive market for energy. Regional governments should 
control their own quotas of pollution permits and the center should implement 
redistributive income transfers. The intensity of household attachment is not an 
obstacle for the efficiency result. 
  22  The result derived in this paper may be applied to many situations whereby 
regional public goods cause interregional spillovers of the form modeled in this paper. 
Consider, for instance, infrastructure activities, such as public transportation systems, 
roads and forestry. Roads provide regional-specific benefits as well as federal-like 
benefits. A central government can induce regions to behave efficiently by 
implementing redistributive transfers and by setting up federal markets for the relevant 
commodities. In future work, we wish to extend our analysis to more general settings 
where the spillovers are not necessarily perfectly substitutable and the market for the 
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